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Cyprus After Elections 
Recapturing the Crans Montana Momentum for Peace Negotiations 
Ioannis N. Grigoriadis 
The beginning of 2018 coincided with elections on both sides of the “Green Line” in 
Cyprus. The 7 January 2018 parliamentary elections in the “Turkish Republic of North-
ern Cyprus (TRNC)” and the 28 January–4 February 2018 presidential elections in the 
Republic of Cyprus reshuffled the Cypriot political landscape. The disillusionment and 
the fatigue of pro-conflict-resolution forces became clear, and the Cyprus question was 
relatively low on the agenda of electoral candidates. Nevertheless, the aftermath of the 
elections finds hardliners and opponents to a UN-brokered peace deal in a weaker posi-
tion. This provides an opportunity for the resumption of peace negotiations from the 
point at which they stalled at Crans Montana last July. Both communities should move 
fast to restore trust and resolve the remaining issues, as international interest should 
not be taken for granted. Inertia or a new failure in peace negotiations is likely to lead 
to the end of UN operations in Cyprus, which would boost insecurity across the island. 
 
Two-round presidential elections in the 
Republic of Cyprus on 28 January and 
4 February 2018 as well as parliamentary 
elections in the internationally unrecog-
nized “Turkish Republic of Northern 
Cyprus (TRNC)” on 7 January 2018 have 
reshaped the political landscape in Cyprus. 
Despite the minor role that the Cyprus 
issue played in both electoral campaigns, 
the post-election political landscape ap-
pears more conducive to a solution. The 
absence of the strongest political party – 
the right-wing National Unity Party (Ulusal 
Birlik Partisi, UBP) – from the new coalition 
government in the “TRNC” and the sound 
defeat of the hardliner Greek Cypriot presi-
dential candidate, Nicolas Papadopoulos, 
improve the political conditions for the 
resumption and successful conclusion of 
the inconclusive peace negotiations at 
Crans Montana. 
Parliamentary Elections in the 
“Turkish Republic of Northern 
Cyprus (TRNC)” 
The results of the 7 January 2018 parlia-
mentary elections in the “TRNC” pointed 
at the declining hopes for a peace settle-
ment among the Turkish Cypriot popula-
tion. The Cyprus issue did not feature high 
in the election campaign, as disenchant-
ment from the recent failure of the latest 
round of the Cyprus peace negotiations 
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took hold. Instead, domestic political issues 
and relations with Turkey were the lead-
ing issues. The UBP was able to impose its 
agenda of strengthening economic and 
political bonds with Turkey as the key item 
of the election campaign. This happened 
despite the extraordinary conditions set 
under the emergency law declared in Tur-
key shortly after the abortive coup of 15 
July 2016. This tactical move proved very 
successful. Corruption allegations against 
the incumbent UBP–Democrat Party (Demo-
krat Parti, DP) coalition government failed 
to harm the UBP, which increased its vote 
share from 23.15 to 35.61 percent and 
won 21 seats. The vote share of the second-
largest party – the Republican Turkish Party 
(Cumhuriyetçi Türk Partisi, CTP) – sharply 
fell from 38.36 to 20.95 percent, and they 
won 12 seats. The newly founded People’s 
Party (Halkın Partisi, HP) of former chief 
negotiator Kudret Özersay came in third, 
winning 17.07 percent and 9 seats. The vote 
share of the center-left Communal Democ-
racy Party (Toplumcu Demokrasi Partisi, 
TDP), with the Turkish Cypriot leader Mus-
tafa Akıncı, rose from 7.40 to 8.65 percent 
and they won 3 seats, whereas the vote 
share of the right-wing DP fell from 23.15 
to 7.82 percent and they gained 3 seats. 
The New Birth Party (Yeniden Doğuş Partisi, 
YDP) – claiming to represent the interests 
of Turkey-born “TRNC” citizens – collected 
6.99 percent of the vote and 2 seats. Despite 
the sharp increase of the UBP’s appeal, the 
decision of its junior coalition partner, DP, 
not to extend its partnership with the UBP 
paved the way for a new multi-party coali-
tion government under Tufan Erhürman, 
leader of the second-largest party, CTP. In 
its recently announced program, the coali-
tion government pledged to improve gov-
ernance structures and deal with corrup-
tion without antagonizing Turkish interests 
in the “TRNC.” 
Although Cyprus peace negotiations are 
considered a prerogative of the president 
and leader of the Turkish Cypriot commu-
nity, the government still maintains con-
siderable leverage in smoothening or hard-
ening the environment of the peace nego-
tiations. In fact, the UBP-DP coalition gov-
ernment had proven rather obstructive to 
the reinforcement of bonds between Greek 
Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots at the civil 
society level. The discontinuation of regular 
mass services in Greek Cypriot churches in 
the north of Cyprus – attended by displaced 
Greek Cypriots who reside in the south due 
to “security concerns” – was one example. 
Attempts to impose tariffs on UN-adminis-
tered food deliveries from Greek Cypriot 
authorities toward Greek Cypriots and 
Maronites still residing in some villages in 
the north was another. The new coalition 
government looks as if it will be forthcom-
ing as far as the promotion of confidence-
building measures and initiatives aiming to 
facilitate peace negotiations are concerned. 
Table 1 
Parliamentary election results  
in the “TRNC” 
 7 / 1 / 2018 (%) 28 / 7 / 2013 (%) 
UBP 35.61 23.15 
CTP 20.95 38.36 
HP 17.07  – 
TDP  8.65  7.40 
DP  7.82 23.15 
YDP  6.99  – 
Presidential Elections in the 
Republic of Cyprus 
The incumbent president, Nicos Anasta-
siades, achieved a rather comfortable re-
election. In the run-off elections of 4 Feb-
ruary, Anastasiades collected 55.99 percent 
of the vote, while Stavros Malas, an inde-
pendent candidate supported by AKEL, 
collected 44.01 percent. In the first round, 
on 27 January, Anastasiades, who was sup-
ported by the center-right Democratic Rally 
(Dimokratikos Synagermos, DISY) party, 
had won 35.74 percent of the vote, while 
Stavros Malas, an independent supported 
by the left Progressive Party of Working 
People (Anorthotiko Kinima Ergazomenou 
Laou, AKEL) won 30.35 percent of the vote. 
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Nikolas Papadopoulos – leader of the cen-
ter-right Democratic Party (Dimokratiko 
Komma, DIKO), who objected most strongly 
to a compromise on the Cyprus question 
and even questioned the fundamental 
premises of a bi-zonal, bi-communal federa-
tion – failed to make it to the second round. 
By collecting 25.74 percent of the vote, 
despite his long and well-funded electoral 
campaign, he was the big loser of this elec-
tion. Two other hardline candidates com-
pleted the picture of the leading candi-
dates. The candidate of the far-right neo-
Nazi National Popular Front (Ethniko Laiko 
Metopo, ELAM), Christos Christou, collected 
5.65 percent of the vote – a performance 
that went above expectations and reeled 
moderate Cypriots – while the former 
minister and leader of the Citizens’ Alliance 
(Symmachia Politon) party, Giorgos Lillikas, 
won a meager 2.18 percent of the vote. 
The election result was a personal suc-
cess for Mr. Anastasiades. He lost only 1.49 
percent of the vote, as compared to the 
57.48 he had won in the second round of 
the 2013 presidential elections. His reelec-
tion was mainly due to his harsh, but ulti-
mately successful, economic policies, which 
led to the recovery of the Cypriot economy 
following the banking crisis, the bank bail-
in, and the memorandum agreement of 
2012–2013 with the EU authorities. Anasta-
siades disappointed many of his supporters 
when he failed to strike a deal in the latest 
round of Cyprus peace negotiations at 
Crans Montana, Switzerland, in July 2017. 
Despite the failure of the negotiations, 
Anastasiades remains the politician who 
could use his personal charisma to con-
vince Greek Cypriots of a compromise 
agreement. Having renewed his popular 
legitimation, he has the opportunity to 
convince skeptics of his resolve to solve 
the Cyprus question. 
Beyond the election of Anastasiades, it 
is important to underline the strong com-
bined performances of the candidates of 
the two parties that have comprised the 
backbone of the conflict-resolution process 
within Greek Cypriot public opinion. Both 
DISY and AKEL, which have historically en-
dorsed the peace process and the principle 
of a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation, col-
lected almost two-thirds of the votes. In con-
trast to poor electoral performances in the 
previous 2016 parliamentary elections, 
DISY and AKEL reconfirmed their positions 
as the two dominant actors within the 
Greek Cypriot community with the poten-
tial to mobilize Greek Cypriot public opin-
ion in favor of a solution. This points to the 
fact that the majority of Greek Cypriots 
would not, in principle, object to a bi-zonal, 
bi-communal federal solution. The attempt 
of Papadopoulos to make a new, more na-
tionalistic approach to Cyprus conflict reso-
lution his flagship issue in the election 
campaign did not pay off. On the other 
hand, the relatively successful performance 
of ELAM underlined an alarming radicali-
zation trend among the opponents of a 
bizonal, bi-communal federation. The elec-
tion results confirmed that if DISY and AKEL 
collaborated – and if Anastasiades employed 
his personal political weight – convincing 
Greek Cypriots of the necessity for a com-
promise solution would be possible. Yet, 
this window of opportunity may not last 
for long. If the actors miss the post-election 
opportunity and disenchantment from the 
peace process turns into cynicism about the 
futility of peace negotiations, then conflict-
resolution prospects will fade again. 
Table 2 
Presidential election results in the 
Republic of Cyprus 
 27 / 1 / 2018 (%) 4 / 2 / 2018 (%) 
Anastasiades  35.51 55.99 
Malas 30.24 44.01 
Papadopoulos 25.74  
Christou  5.65  
Lillikas  2.18  
Restoring Trust and the Peace Process 
Momentum 
The failure of the latest negotiations round 
at Crans Montana, Switzerland, in July 2017 




lution supporters. It also damaged the 
levels of trust between Greek and Turkish 
Cypriot leaders – a precious and indispen-
sable commodity for any breakthrough. 
Some considered peace deal efforts to be 
futile because all involved parties appeared 
more comfortable with the status quo than 
they were willing to admit publicly. Hence, 
they would not be ready to take the coura-
geous steps necessary for a compromise 
agreement. Such views would underesti-
mate the risks that the collapse of the peace 
process would incur to all involved parties, 
and Greek and Turkish Cypriots, in particu-
lar. On the other hand, one should not un-
derestimate the progress achieved in several 
chapters of the recent Cyprus peace negotia-
tions, including security. The resumption 
of the negotiations within the framework 
set by the UN Secretary-General, Antonio 
Guterres, at Crans Montana remains the 
optimal option. Deadlocks in security nego-
tiations that stalled the peace talks at Crans 
Montana could be smoothened by applying 
a human security-centered approach on 
issues such as environment, cultural herit-
age, and governance. Reaching compromise 
solutions that address the fundamental con-
cerns of all parties and overcoming a zero-
sum game mentality that all sides condemn 
in theory – but not in practice – are essen-
tial steps. The election results have pointed 
at the disenchantment and demoralization 
of Greek and Turkish Cypriot peace sup-
porters but have also made a possible com-
promise easier. 
Although sharp differences in opinion 
within the Turkish Cypriot administration 
and the specter of upcoming presidential 
elections in the Republic of Cyprus func-
tioned as a pretext not to take the hard but 
necessary steps toward a solution, both con-
cerns are no longer valid. Turkish Cypriots 
have now elected a government whose views 
resonate with those of Mustafa Akıncı. The 
newly reelected president of the Republic 
of Cyprus has the popular legitimacy to 
take the necessary difficult steps and does 
not have to think while under the Damo-
cles’ sword of upcoming elections. Making 
the harsh but necessary economic decisions 
in the beginning of his first term paid off 
well in the recent elections because there 
was ample time for the economic measures 
to have their beneficial effects on the Cyp-
riot economy. Hard but necessary decisions 
on the Cyprus issue could prove equally 
wise. Time is working against efforts to 
achieve a negotiated federal solution, but 
any outcome other than that, such as par-
tition or the continuation of the status quo, 
would leave both communities worse off. 
It is also in the interests of both Greece and 
Turkey to resume and conclude the Cyprus 
peace negotiations. Otherwise, Cyprus will 
continue to poison both Greek-Turkish and 
EU-Turkish relations. The recent escalation 
in the Greek-Turkish dispute over the Imia/ 
Kardak islets and Turkey’s attempt to ob-
struct natural gas exploration activities 
within the Cypriot Exclusive Economic 
Zone underline that a negative spillover 
between the Greek-Turkish and Cyprus dis-
putes remains possible. On their side, both 
Anastasiades and Akıncı must show the 
leadership that the world had expected 
from them but were unable to deliver; they 
will have to display the commitment and 
resolve that lacked in the last phase of the 
recent negotiations round. The decades-
long support of the international commu-
nity could soon expire if it turns out that 
Greek and Turkish Cypriots are not willing 
to rise to the occasion. The presumed “com-
fort” of the current status quo is contingent 
upon the presence of the UN peacekeeping 
and good offices missions, the departures of 
which would dramatically alter the security 
environment on the island. It is up to the 
willingness of Anastasiades and Akıncı to 
conclude an agreement that protects the 
fundamental interests of all Cypriots. 
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